---
title: "Trust Center — Hanah (US)"
description: "Hanah Trust Center (United States): security and privacy controls, and service providers for the US production deployment."
source: https://hanah.health/us/trust/
---

# Trust Center

Transparency for clinicians, practice owners, and institutional buyers. This page summarises how Hanah handles health information, which service providers are in scope for the production deployment, and how each security control relates to the HIPAA Security, Privacy and Breach Notification Rules. Status markers are a temporary editorial aid and will be removed once every item is production-verified.

✅ Done 🔧 Implemented bespoke

Overview Controls Framework mapping Service providers Resources

**Who this is for:** Clinics, health networks, privacy officers, and IT security teams doing due diligence on Hanah. **At a glance:** this Trust Center summarises Hanah's security controls and the service providers in scope for the production deployment. Clinical records are stored in the . Speech recognition runs with a specialist provider in the United States, and AI drafting with providers in the United States and other countries where they operate facilities, under terms that prohibit training on your content. Deeper evidence sits in our Security & Operations Handbook; the **Controls** tab describes how each control is implemented.

### Security controls

Encryption, access control, network segmentation, logging, backup/DR, and AI-specific safeguards — with an honest status per line.

View controls →

### HIPAA mapped to GDPR, ISO and SOC 2

Each HIPAA requirement next to its Australian, GDPR, NZ, ISO/IEC 27001 and SOC 2 counterparts, and the Hanah control that meets it.

View mapping →

### Service providers

Which categories of provider handle data, for what purpose, what they keep, and where they process it.

View service providers →

### Resources & next steps

Service status and how to request full policy packs under NDA.

View resources →[

### Validation methodology

How we measure transcription accuracy and documentation hallucination — one harness, one corpus, two evaluation layers (WER + LLM jury). The rules every published number is graded by.

Read the methodology →](https://hanah.health/us/trust/wer-methodology/index.html)[

### Validation transparency

Per-recording transcripts, generated documents, and per-LLM juror verdicts against an authoritative ground-truth corpus. The full data, not just headline numbers.

View report →](https://hanah.health/us/trust/transparency/index.html)[

### Past results

Every benchmark we have published, with the change against the run before it. Numbers are left exactly as they were measured on the day — including where the grading panel itself has since changed.

Compare runs →](https://hanah.health/us/trust/benchmarks/index.html)

Each row is a control in the usual ISO sense: **policy** (governance and documented procedure), **technical** (enforced by systems and configuration), or **vendor** (contractual and subprocessor assurance). Tags show the dominant evidence type; many rows combine more than one. Detail traces to our internal **Security & Operations Handbook**. The line under each row cites the HIPAA provisions (45 CFR) that control corresponds to — indicative only, not a substitute for legal advice.

**Authority:** [HIPAA Administrative Simplification regulations](https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/index.html), 45 CFR Part 164: Subpart C (Security Rule), Subpart D (Breach Notification Rule) and Subpart E (Privacy Rule).

Technical System and platform controls — infrastructure, application, cryptography, automation. Policy Organisation-level governance — accountability, signed policies, risk register, procedural evidence. Vendor Third-party reliance — DPA terms, subprocessor list, supplier certifications.

## Infrastructure & platform

Infrastructure security

Defines where Hanah runs for the regional deployment, how production is segmented from operations, and how encryption protects customer data between clinicians, our stack, and AI subprocessors. These are mostly technical controls with administrative backing in the Security & Operations Handbook.

-   ✅
    
    Technical Policy
    
    **Region-resident production workloads**
    
    Primary application servers, databases, object storage, and backups for the deployment are located in-region. Administrative records describe regions and change approval; technical deployment pins resources to the regional project.
    
    **HIPAA alignment:** §164.308(a)(1)(ii)(A)–(B) risk analysis and risk management; §164.310(a)(1) facility access controls, held by the hosting provider. Records are stored in the United States; processing by providers is listed under Service providers.
    
-   ✅
    
    Technical
    
    **Encryption in transit**
    
    Public ingress uses modern TLS. Traffic to speech recognition and AI model providers uses TLS to each provider's configured endpoints. This is a technical control verified in architecture reviews and deployment config.
    
    **HIPAA alignment:** §164.312(e)(1) transmission security; §164.312(e)(2)(ii) encryption.
    
-   ✅
    
    Technical Policy
    
    **Encryption at rest**
    
    Databases, object storage, and backup objects use industry-standard algorithms (e.g. AES-256-GCM) with keys managed per our cryptography policy. WAL-G backups add client-side encryption before off-site storage.
    
    **HIPAA alignment:** §164.312(a)(2)(iv) encryption and decryption; §164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A) data backup plan.
    
-   ✅
    
    Technical Vendor
    
    **Edge DDoS protection and WAF**
    
    A managed edge layer fronts public hostnames, absorbing volumetric attacks and applying WAF rules for common web abuse. Provider-level protections and tight firewall posture remain in place behind the edge.
    
    **HIPAA alignment:** §164.306(a)(1) availability of electronic protected health information; §164.308(a)(7) contingency plan.
    
-   ✅
    
    Technical Policy
    
    **Intrusion detection**
    
    Layered detection: the hosting platform provides network-layer IDS, while each VM runs fail2ban (SSH brute-force prevention), UFW with default-deny posture, and unattended security upgrades. Authentication and access events from the auth-proxy are shipped to a central Loki/Grafana stack so anomalous login patterns surface in dashboards and alerts. Policies assign triage ownership when alerts fire. Kernel-level runtime IDS for containers is a planned enhancement on top of this baseline.
    
    **HIPAA alignment:** §164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) information system activity review; §164.308(a)(6) security incident procedures; §164.312(b) audit controls.
    

## Product & application

Product security

How users authenticate, how authorisation is enforced in the product and API layer, and how we build and ship software. Mixes technical enforcement (JWT, RBAC) with administrative SDLC and review requirements.

-   ✅
    
    Technical Vendor
    
    **Authentication and sessions**
    
    Clinicians authenticate through a managed identity provider (OIDC/OAuth-style flows); every API path validates identity. Session lifetime and lockout behaviour align with our access-control policy.
    
    **HIPAA alignment:** §164.312(d) person or entity authentication; §164.312(a)(2)(iii) automatic logoff.
    
-   ✅
    
    Technical Policy
    
    **Role-based access control**
    
    Clinician, patient, and admin capabilities are separated in the data model and GraphQL layer so least-privilege is the default. Role definitions and review cadence are documented administratively.
    
    **HIPAA alignment:** §164.312(a)(1) access control; §164.308(a)(4) information access management; §164.502(b) minimum necessary.
    
-   ✅
    
    Technical Policy
    
    **Mandatory MFA for privileged paths**
    
    Mandatory MFA is enforced for accounts that can change security-sensitive settings or access high-risk data, via our identity provider.
    
    **HIPAA alignment:** §164.312(d) person or entity authentication.
    
-   ✅
    
    Technical Policy
    
    **Secure development lifecycle**
    
    Changes flow through source control, review, and pinned dependencies. Security impact is considered for substantive features as an administrative gate; technical tools (Dependabot, etc.) support ongoing hygiene.
    
    **HIPAA alignment:** §164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B) risk management; §164.308(a)(8) evaluation.
    
-   ✅
    
    Technical Policy
    
    **Software bill of materials (SBOM)**
    
    Each release carries a machine-readable inventory of dependencies for vulnerability response. SBOM export is wired into CI as part of our supply-chain assurance programme.
    
    **HIPAA alignment:** §164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B) risk management; §164.308(a)(5)(ii)(B) protection from malicious software.
    

## Data & privacy

Data & privacy

Retention, deletion, subject rights, and visibility into security-relevant events. These controls pair automated enforcement in the product and database with administrative procedures (DSAR handling, breach notification, quarterly reporting).

-   ✅
    
    Technical Policy
    
    **Retention and deletion for ambient artefacts**
    
    Audio and transcript material defaults to a short retention window with automated deletion; clinical notes follow each organisation’s retention policy. Once integrated with your record system, the authoritative clinical record remains yours.
    
    **HIPAA alignment:** §164.310(d)(2)(i) disposal; §164.502(b) minimum necessary.
    
-   ✅
    
    Technical Policy
    
    **Tamper-evident deletion log and quarterly reports**
    
    Retention-driven deletions are recorded in `deletion_log`, an append-only Postgres table with no `UPDATE` or `DELETE` grants to any role. Each row links to the previous one by SHA-256 hash chain (`row_hash = sha256(prev_hash ‖ canonical(metadata))`), so altering or removing any earlier row breaks every subsequent hash and is detected by the in-database verifier `hanah_verify_deletion_chain()`. Companion audit tables (`ai_audit`, `secret_access_audit`) are also append-only. Quarterly customer-facing rollups are produced by `hanah_deletion_report_quarter(year, quarter)`.
    
    **HIPAA alignment:** §164.312(b) audit controls; §164.312(c)(1) integrity; §164.316(b) documentation.
    
-   ✅
    
    Policy Technical
    
    **Data subject access and correction**
    
    Individuals can request access to or correction of their personal information; Hanah documents timelines, formats (JSON + human-readable exports), and escalation paths. Tooling supports export where data lives in Hanah systems.
    
    **HIPAA alignment:** §164.524 right of access; §164.526 amendment. Hanah supports the practice's response.
    
-   🔧
    
    Technical Policy
    
    **Unified audit visibility**
    
    Security-relevant events (authentication, privilege use, configuration changes) are queryable for institutional customers and forwardable to your SIEM (for example Microsoft Sentinel) where contractually agreed. Configured per customer.
    
    **HIPAA alignment:** §164.312(b) audit controls; §164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) information system activity review.
    

## AI & clinical safety

AI security & compliance

Controls specific to ambient AI: no secondary use of health data for training, human oversight before clinical reliance, measurement of quality (WER), and abuse-resistant prompting. Combines contractual third-party controls with product workflow and clinical governance.

-   ✅
    
    Vendor Policy Technical
    
    **No secondary use for model training**
    
    Our speech recognition and AI model providers' terms prohibit training on customer content, and requests are sent with provider-side storage switched off wherever the provider offers it. Hanah does not operate an internal training pipeline on your health data. Administrative vendor reviews support the claim.
    
    **HIPAA alignment:** §164.502(a) uses and disclosures, limited to the purpose the practice engaged Hanah for; providers are contractually bound not to train on or retain content beyond the terms shown under Service providers.
    
-   ✅
    
    Policy Technical
    
    **Human-in-the-loop before clinical reliance**
    
    Generated notes require explicit clinician review and finalisation before they are treated as part of the clinical record. This is both a product control (workflow gates) and a policy commitment in the PIA.
    
    **HIPAA alignment:** §164.312(c)(1) integrity; §164.526 amendment.
    
-   ✅
    
    Policy Technical
    
    **WER methodology and published cohort results**
    
    One harness, two evaluation layers, run on every grading pass: **Word Error Rate** against verbatim ground-truth transcripts (Layer A), and an **LLM jury panel** measuring both _coverage_ (does the note capture each pre-registered expectation?) and _hallucination_ (does the note contain claims the transcript does not support — i.e. content the model invented?). The [full methodology](https://hanah.health/us/trust/wer-methodology/index.html) is published, and [live results](https://hanah.health/us/trust/transparency/index.html) render directly from the harness's aggregate output. The corpus continues to graduate v1 (synthetic) → v2 (role-play) → v3 (real consent-based) → v4 (joint with health-system partners).
    
    **HIPAA alignment:** §164.312(c)(1) integrity; §164.308(a)(8) evaluation.
    
-   ✅
    
    Technical Policy
    
    **Prompt injection and unsafe-output monitoring**
    
    System prompts are server-controlled and inputs are bounded by the clinical workflow (no free-form chat surface). Provider safety classifiers run on every generation; when they trigger, the stream surfaces a content-filter finish reason that is captured in the per-call `ai_audit` row alongside a canonical `ai.content_policy` error code, latency, tokens, and a Tempo trace ID. Anomalous patterns surface in dashboards over that audit table. Cross-call behavioural anomaly detection for abuse patterns is a planned enhancement on top of this baseline.
    
    **HIPAA alignment:** §164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) information system activity review; §164.308(a)(5)(ii)(B) protection from malicious software.
    
-   ✅
    
    Technical Policy
    
    **Multi-party consent capture in product**
    
    When the clinician clicks record, the product opens a consent dialog requiring explicit confirmation that consent has been obtained from the patient and any other participants in the session. Recording cannot begin until that check is acknowledged, and the confirmation is bound to the encounter alongside clinic policy referenced in the privacy impact assessment.
    
    **HIPAA alignment:** §164.506(b) consent for treatment uses. State recording laws also apply: several states, including California and Florida, require every party to consent to a recording.
    

## Organisation & third parties

Organisational security

How Hanah the company governs security: accountability, policies, independent assurance, and integration with customer security tooling. These are primarily administrative controls; some have technical deliverables (e.g. SIEM connectors).

-   ✅
    
    Policy
    
    **Security governance and risk register**
    
    A named executive is accountable for information security; risks are logged with owners and target dates and reviewed on a fixed cadence. This matches what buyers typically expect from an ISO-style management system, even at our current scale.
    
    **HIPAA alignment:** §164.308(a)(2) assigned security responsibility; §164.308(a)(1) security management process.
    
-   ✅
    
    Policy
    
    **Board-approved policy pack**
    
    Formal policies cover access, cryptography, incident response, vendors, and change management. The pack is board-approved and held under version control; full content is available under NDA.
    
    **HIPAA alignment:** §164.316 policies, procedures and documentation.
    
-   🔧
    
    Policy Technical
    
    **Customer SIEM forwarding (e.g. Sentinel)**
    
    Security events from Hanah-controlled systems are forwarded into your Sentinel workspace (or equivalent) for joint monitoring where contractually agreed. Configured per institutional customer.
    
    **HIPAA alignment:** §164.308(a)(6) security incident procedures; §164.312(b) audit controls; supports the practice's breach assessment under §164.402.
    

Due-diligence questionnaires in the United States usually arrive written against HIPAA, and sometimes against ISO/IEC 27001 or SOC 2. This table starts from each HIPAA requirement, lists the nearest provision in the Australian Privacy Principles, GDPR, the NZ Privacy Act, ISO/IEC 27001 and SOC 2, and names the Hanah control that meets it.

Equivalences are indicative and not legal advice.

| HIPAA requirement | Australian Privacy Principles | GDPR / UK GDPR | NZ Privacy Act 2020 / HIPC 2020 | ISO/IEC 27001:2022 | SOC 2 (TSC 2017) | How Hanah meets it |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| §164.530(a), (i) — Privacy official, policies and procedures | APP 1 open and transparent management | Art. 5(2) accountability; Art. 24, 30 | s 201 privacy officer | Cl. 5.2 policy; A.5.1 | CC1.1–CC1.3; CC2.3 | Named accountable executive, risk register, board-approved policy pack, and this Trust Center. |
| §164.520 — Notice of privacy practices | APP 5 notification of collection | Art. 13–14 information to be provided | IPP 3; HIPC Rule 3 | A.5.34 | P1.1 notice | In-product consent step; privacy policy names the countries where data is processed. |
| §164.502(b), §164.514(d) — Minimum necessary | APP 3 collection of solicited information | Art. 5(1)(b)–(c) purpose limitation and minimisation | IPP 1, 2, 4; HIPC Rules 1, 2, 4 | A.5.34 | P3.1–P3.2 collection | Collection limited to the encounter the clinician starts, with consent confirmed before every recording. |
| §164.502(a), §164.506 — Permitted uses and disclosures | APP 6 use or disclosure | Art. 5(1)(b) purpose limitation; Art. 28 processor terms | IPP 10, 11; HIPC Rules 10, 11 | A.5.34; A.5.10 acceptable use | P4.1 use; P6.1 disclosure to third parties | Processing only on the practice's instructions; no secondary use and no model training. |
| §164.508(a)(3) — Marketing authorisation | APP 7 direct marketing | Art. 21(2)–(3) right to object to direct marketing | No direct equivalent (Unsolicited Electronic Messages Act 2007) | No direct equivalent | P2.1 | Patient information is never used for marketing; patients hear from a practice only when a clinician sends something. |
| §164.502(e), §164.504(e), §164.308(b) — Business associates and subcontractors | APP 8 cross-border disclosure | Art. 28 processors; Chapter V, Art. 44–49 international transfers | IPP 12; HIPC Rule 12 | A.5.19–A.5.22 supplier relationships | CC9.2 vendor risk; P6.4 | Records stored in the United States. Providers are listed by country under Service providers, with contractual no-training and retention limits. |
| §164.312(c) — Integrity | APP 10 quality of personal information | Art. 5(1)(d) accuracy | IPP 8; HIPC Rule 8 | A.5.34 | P7.1 quality | Clinician review before a note is finalised; published accuracy and hallucination measurement. |
| §164.308, §164.310, §164.312 — Administrative, physical and technical safeguards | APP 11.1 security of personal information | Art. 32 security of processing | IPP 5; HIPC Rule 5 | A.5.15, A.8.5 access and authentication; A.8.24 cryptography; A.8.13 backup; A.8.15–A.8.16 logging and monitoring | CC6 logical access; CC7 system operations; CC8 change management | Encryption in transit and at rest, role-based access, MFA for privileged paths, intrusion detection, encrypted backups. |
| §164.310(d)(2)(i) — Disposal | APP 11.2 destruction or de-identification; APP 4 unsolicited information | Art. 5(1)(e) storage limitation; Art. 17 erasure | IPP 9; HIPC Rule 9 | A.8.10 information deletion | C1.2 disposal; P4.3 | Raw audio is deleted once the transcript is produced; audio and transcripts are deleted automatically and recorded in a tamper-evident deletion log. |
| §164.524 — Right of access | APP 12 access | Art. 15 access; Art. 20 portability | IPP 6; HIPC Rule 6 | A.5.34 | P5.1 access | Exports in JSON and human-readable formats to support the practice's response. |
| §164.526 — Amendment | APP 13 correction | Art. 16 rectification | IPP 7; HIPC Rule 7 | A.5.34 | P5.2 correction | Clinicians edit and re-finalise notes; amendment requests follow a documented procedure. |
| §164.400–414 — Breach Notification Rule | Part IIIC Notifiable Data Breaches scheme | Art. 33–34 breach notification | Part 6 notifiable privacy breaches | A.5.24–A.5.27 incident management | CC7.3–CC7.5 incident response | Incident response policy, central security logging, and support for the practice's risk assessment and notification. |

These are the categories of service provider that **may process or store Hanah customer data** in our production architecture, what each handles, what it keeps, and where it processes data. Every provider is bound by contract to protect customer data, and none may train models on it. Clinician sign-in uses global identity infrastructure that holds **no patient health information**.

| Service category | Purpose | Data handled | Retention | Processing region |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |

Operational transparency: a public **status** page (uptime and incidents) sits alongside the production `/healthz` readiness endpoint used by our own monitoring.

[Service status](https://hanah.health/us/trust/status/index.html "Per-component health, 90-day uptime, and incident history for the US deployment.") [Request full security pack under NDA](mailto:security@hanah.health?subject=Trust%20%2F%20security%20pack%20request) [Back to hanah.health](https://hanah.health/index.html)

PhysiPal Pty Ltd (trading as Hanah) — . This Trust Center is a high-level summary. Contractual commitments, and data processing terms in force at signing supersede this page. Status emoji markers (✅ 🔧) are temporary and will be removed after independent verification of each row.
